Bottom-Up Corporate Governance by Landier, Augustin et al.
Bottom-Up Corporate Governance∗
Augustin Landier † David Sraer‡ David Thesmar§
October 20, 2005
Abstract
In many instances, “independently-minded” top-ranking execu-
tives can impose strong discipline on their CEO, even though they
are formally under his authority. This paper argues that the use of
such a disciplining mechanism is a key feature of good corporate gov-
ernance.
We provide robust empirical evidence consistent with the fact that
firms with high internal governance are more efficiently run. We em-
pirically label as “independent from the CEO” a top executive who
joined the firm before the current CEO was appointed. In a very robust
way, firms with a smaller fraction of independent executives exhibit
(1) a lower level of profitability and (2) lower shareholder returns after
large acquisitions. These results are unaffected when we control for
traditional governance measures such as board independence or other
well-studied shareholder-friendly provisions.
1 Introduction
Academics and practitioners have long known that in the absence of tight
monitoring, CEOs of large publicly held firms may take actions that are
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detrimental to their shareholders: they commit the firm’s resources to value-
destroying “pet” projects, build unprofitable empires, prevent valuable takeovers
from happening, or even, in some rare yet highly publicized instances, engage
in fraudulent window-dressing or asset-tunneling. To set up counter-powers
to the CEO, the consensus among practitioners and regulators has been to
rely on a strong board of directors, independent from the management. In
many countries, informal codes of corporate governance have been recom-
mending the appointment of independent directors for more than a decade.1
In the US, the recent wave of corporate scandals has triggered a stronger
regulatory response, making the hiring of independent directors mandatory
for firms listed on the major stock exchanges.2
Unfortunately, the findings of the academic literature regarding the ef-
ficiency of independent boards are mixed. To be fair, independent boards
of directors seem to pay more attention to corporate performance when it
comes to CEO turnover or compensation (Weisbach (1988), Morck, Shleifer
and Vishny (1989), Dahya, Mac Connel and Travlos (2002)). Also, there
is some limited evidence that the stock market hails the appointment of
independent directors with small abnormal returns (Rosenstein and Wyatt
(1990)). However, an unsettling result is that there is no evidence that inde-
pendent boards improve profitability or even the value of corporate assets.3
1As a matter of fact, many large firms have been eager to comply with their guidelines.
For instance, the Cadbury Report issued in the UK in 1992 recommends that “the majority
of non-executives on a board should be independent of the company” . The 1998 “Viénot
II” Report in France proposes that “independent directors should account for at least one-
third of the Board of Directors”. Compliance with these guidelines was not mandatory, but
widespread. For instance, by 1996, more than 50% of the UK firms surveyed by Dahya, Mc
Connel and Travlos (2002) claimed to comply with the Cadbury Report recommendations.
2Since 2003, the NYSE and the NASDAQ have required a majority of independent
directors on the board of companies listed on their exchanges.
3In fact, the correlation might even be negative. A likely reason for this is that poorly
performing firms tend to appoint more outside directors (Kaplan and Minton (1994)).
Filtering out this endogeneity leads to no apparent correlation between profitability and
board independence (Baghat and Black (2003), Hermalin and Weisbach (2003)).
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As a result, corporate governance scholars have recently shifted their at-
tention away from board composition towards other dimensions of corporate
governance evident in executive compensation, corporate charters, bylaws
or state takeover laws. The main finding of this literature is that investor-
friendly corporate governance provisions boost the value of assets by making
firms more vulnerable to takeovers (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), Cre-
mers, John and Nair (2005)). In fact, such provisions seem to matter only to
the extent that they allow shareholders to receive takeover premia (Bebchuk
and Cohen (2004)). Apart from increasing vulnerability to takeovers, they
seem to have no effect on actual corporate performance.
This paper suggests another way to measure corporate governance at the
firm level. We start with the following hypothesis: in well governed firms,
“independently minded” top executives are able to challenge and discipline
CEO decision making, even though they are formally under his authority.
We call this mechanism “internal governance.” As it turns out, the quality of
internal governance, as we measure it, is strongly (and positively) correlated
with corporate performance in US data.
This paper provides robust evidence that firms with good internal gover-
nance are more profitable and make better acquisitions. We start with the
issue of measurement. In a panel of US listed corporations, we measure the
quality of internal governance as the fraction of top-ranking executives who
joined the firm before the current CEO was appointed. Our underlying hy-
pothesis is that the CEO is always involved in the appointment process of top
executives. Executives hired after the CEO took the job will thus (1) share
the same preferences and/or (2) have an incentive to “return the favor.” Un-
der this assumption, by focusing on the fraction of top executives who joined
the firm before the CEO was appointed to the top job, we measure the extent
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to which executives are “independent” from the CEO.
The first piece of evidence concerns corporate performance. Using various
profitability measures, we find that good internal governance (independent
executives) is strongly associated with good performance. Our interpreta-
tion that internal governance causes performance holds of various robustness
checks. In particular, our findings are not affected when we control for tradi-
tional, “external” corporate governance measures. This is not surprising as
external governance is known to be uncorrelated with firm performance.
The second piece of evidence concerns the costs of acquisitions, measured
as the acquirer’s long run stock returns. Consistently with previous stud-
ies, they are strongly negative (Loughran and Vijh, 1997). As it turns out,
good internal governance is associated with a much smaller loss for the ac-
quiror’s shareholders. This is consistent with the fact that some independent
executives - in particular the firm’s CFO - can prevent overtly expansive
acquisitions from taking place. Importantly, however, regular indices of ex-
ternal governance are not correlated with the shareholders’ losses made after
an acquisition. The board of directors, takeover pressure or the corporate
charter design are less efficient at preventing bad/expensive acquisitions from
being made.
Such evidence suggests that the quality of internal governance actually
predicts future stock returns, at least for acquiring firms. One possible inter-
pretation is that the market may not have completely priced the benefits of
good internal governance, or that these benefits turned out to be greater than
expected. When we broaden our analysis to all firms for which we were able
to retrieve an internal governance index, we find that, over the 1993-2003
period, a strategy long in good internal governance firms, and short in poor
internal governance, could yield an excess return (alpha) as high as 0.5% per
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month.
We interpret this evidence as follows: “Independent” executives may be
more prone to disagreeing with their CEO and as a result may become less
willing to implement his decisions. An obvious cost of such disputes is the
potential paralysis of the chain of command, or at the very least poor imple-
mentation of the CEO’s orders (see e.g. Van Den Steen [2005]). However, the
need to elicit the support of his top executives is taken into account by the
CEO; it prevents him from undertaking controversial projects. Note that the
internal governance mechanism that we have in mind need not arise through
an open conflict between the CEO and his subordinates, nor through pub-
lic denouncements of corporate malpractices (“whistleblowing”). Instead,
because an executive’s job is difficult, complex and hard to monitor, it is
always easy for unconvinced subordinates to shirk, slightly modify orders or
even lie about the feasibility of the CEO’s strategy. Thus, talented leaders
will internalize such constraints, and because they do, will gain credibility
among their executives. Such organisations probably make fewer mistakes
(because talented leaders "listen" to their troops), but are also less likely
to carry out the CEO’s vision successfully (because of the paralysis effect).4
Which effect dominates is an empirical question, but in the context of cor-
porate governance, the evidence presented in this paper points toward net
benefits of internal governance.
The relevance of internal governance may have at least two normative
implications for practioners of corporate governance. First, we learn from
our statistical analysis that the intensity of such internal governance can be
at least partly observed, and could be included in the various indexes of the
4The “internal governance” hypothesis is investigated theoretically in a companion
paper (Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar, 2005). For more details about the model and its
results, see also the conclusion of this paper.
5
quality of a firm’s corporate governance. Second, in addition to management
monitoring and advising, a key role of the board should also consist of de-
signing the optimal balance of power within the firm. Therefore, the human
resource role of the board is not limited to the frequently emphasized CEO
succession problem.
The paper has five more sections. Section 2 describes the datasets we use
and how we construct our index of internal governance. Section 3 looks at
the relation between internal governance and corporate performance. Section
4 looks at the costs of acquisitions. Section 5 discusses the relation between
our internal governance index and existing corporate governance measures.
Section 6 concludes with theoretical questions raised by our findings.
2 Data and Measurement Issues
We first describe the datasets we use to complete our study. We then dis-
cuss the construction of our index of “internal governance” and outline its
strengths and weaknesses.
2.1 Datasets
We use five datasets. EXECUCOMP provides us with the firm level organi-
zational variables with which we proxy for internal governance. COMPUS-
TAT provides us with firm level accounting information. IRRC’s corporate
governance and director dataset allows us to obtain standard measures of
external corporate governance. Acquisitions are drawn from SDC Platinium,
and stock returns from CRSP.
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2.1.1 Internal Governance
The first dataset is the EXECUCOMP panel of (at least) the five best paid
executives of the largest American corporations. We use this data source
to measure the extent of “internal governance” in the firm. We do this by
computing the fraction of executives hired after the CEO took office (i.e. the
fraction of non-independent executives). Thus, internal governance is said to
be poor when this fraction is high.
Initially, each observation is an executive (or the CEO) in a given firm
in a given year. We focus on years from 1992 to 2002; we start by remov-
ing observations for which the executive identifying number is missing. We
also exclude duplicate observations. In this (nearly) raw dataset, there are
120,762 observations, which correspond to some 1,840 firms per year (20,230
firm-years) with an average of six executives each (including the CEO). As
it turns out, 3,499 firm-year observations have no CEO (using the CEOANN
dummy variable indicating which executive is the CEO). In some cases, it
is possible to infer the CEO’s identity because, for one of the executives,
the BECAMECE variable (date at which the executive became CEO) is non
missing, even though the CEOANN dummy is missing (misleadingly indicat-
ing that the executive is not the CEO). By filling in these gaps, we obtain
2,472 firm year observations, and end up with 19,203 firm-years for which
we know the identity of the CEO (a total of 115,933 observations in the
executive-firm-year dataset).
To compute the fraction of non indenpendent executives, we will need to
compare the CEO’s tenure to the executives’ seniorities within the company.
A first approach - which corresponds to the results listed in the paper - is
to rely on the seniority (within the firm) and tenure (within the position)
variables reported in EXECUCOMP. The BECAMECE variable gives us, for
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the current CEO, the precise date at which he(she) was appointed as CEO
whether he(she) was hired from inside or outside the firm. Other executives’
seniorities can be recovered using the JOINED_C variable, which reports
the date at which the executive actually joined the firm. Unfortunately, these
variables are often missing: we lose 2,291 firm-years (12,262 executives-firm-
years) by focusing on firms where the CEO’s date of appointment is non
missing. We then lose a further 6,760 firm years (39,695 executives-firm-
years) by restricting ourselves to firms where we have non missing seniority
for at least one executive. We end up with 11,179 firm-years, from 1992 to
2002, for which we can now compute the fraction of executives hired after
the current CEO. We call this measure of executive dependence FRAC1.
Overall, we lose 19,203-11,179=8,024 firm-year observations in the process
of constructing our measure of internal governance, mostly because many
executives do not report their seniority within the firm. In 4,307 of our
remaining 11,179 firm-years, internal governance is measured by comparing
the CEO’s tenure with the seniority of only one executive.
This means that FRAC1 will be a very noisy measure of executive de-
pendence; while this does not create an obviously spurious correlation with
corporate performance or returns to acquisitions, it is going to bias our esti-
mates of the effect of internal governance downwards, as measurement error
often does. A second approach would be to dispense wih the seniority and
tenure variables altogether and make direct use of the fact that we can fol-
low individuals in the EXECUCOMP panel. To remove left censorship (the
panel starts in 1992), we need to restrict ourselves to firms where we ob-
serve at least one episode of CEO turnover. Once the new CEO has been
appointed, we can compute the fraction of executives that were not listed in
the dataset before the new CEO started (we name this alternative variable
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FRAC2). The main advantage of this approach is that we can dispense
of both BECAMECE and JOINED_C variables, which are often missing.
The cost is that the need to observe CEO turnover restricts the number of
firm-years to 6,617. This is less that the 11,179 observations available to
compute FRAC1. Also, focusing on firms with at least one CEO turnover
over the course of ten years may mechanically overweight firms facing gover-
nance problems. Finally, executives enter the panel when they either (1) are
hired by the firm, (2) make it into the five best paid people list, or (3) the
firm decides to report their pay in its annual report/proxy. Hence, entry in
the panel is a very noisy measure of hiring.
In spite of its shortcomings, the second - panel based - variable FRAC2
has a correlation coefficient of 0.41 with the first - seniority based - variable
FRAC1. Both approaches led to results very similar in terms of size and
significance, so we chose to focus here on the first measurement approach.
Of course, estimates based on FRAC2 are available from the authors upon
request.
2.1.2 Corporate Accounts
Our tests will correlate internal governance with corporate performance.
Thus, for each firm-year observation from our EXECUCOMP sample, we
retrieve firm level accounting information from COMPUSTAT (we lose only
161 observations, for which we cannot find the book value of assets, in the
merging process). We match by GVKEY identifier. We compute profitabil-
ity as return on assets (ROA).5 We construct Market to Book as the ratio of
the firm’s assets market value to their book value, as in Gompers, Ishii and
5Return on Assets is Operating Income Before Depreciation (item 13) minus Depreci-
ation and Amortization (item 14) over Total Assets (item 6).
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Metrick (2003).6 We proxy firm size by log(total assets). We proxy firm age
by taking the difference between the current year and the first year of pres-
ence in the COMPUSTAT panel. We construct the 48 Fama-French industry
dummies using the firm’s 4 digit SIC industry code. Variable constructions
are presented in detail in appendix B. Finally, we windsorize some variables
(ROA, Market to Book) at the 1% and 99% levels.
2.1.3 External Governance
We will also look at how our measure of internal governance correlates with
traditionnal corporate governance measures. Thus, for each firm year observa-
tion, we gather information on corporate governance from IRRC’s corporate
governance and directors dataset. This dataset provides us with commonly
used proxies for corporate governance, namely, the fraction of independent
directors, the number of directors sitting on the board and the fraction of
former employees sitting on the board. These variables are available for the
1996-2001 period only, and mostly for large firms. Out of 11,179 firm-year
observations where we can measure internal governance, only 4,531 observa-
tions have information from IRRC.
We will also look at the increasingly popular Gompers, Ishii, and Met-
rick’s (hereafter GIM) index of corporate governance, which compiles various
corporate governance provisions included in the CEO’s compensation pack-
age, in the corporate charter and the board structure. The GIM index is
available for 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998 and 2001. In other years, we assume
that it takes the value that it had in the most recent year when it was non
missing. Again, just over a half (5,872 over 11,179) of our observations have
6Market to Book is the ratio of market to book value of assets (item 6). The market
value is computed as Total Assets (item 6) plus the number of common shares outstanding
(item 25) times share price at the end of the fiscal year (item 199) minus Common Equity
(item 60) minus Deferred Taxes (item 74).
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a defined GIM index.
2.1.4 Acquisitions
To see if top ranking executives are able to constrain major CEO decisions, we
focus on the effect of internal governance on the acquisition performance. We
obtain the list of firms who made significant acquisitions from SDC Platinium
(deals of value larger than $ 300 million). SDC provides us with the bidder’s
CUSIP and the transaction value of the deal. We focus on completed deals
where the bidder bought at least 50% of the target’s shares.
For each firm-year observation in our EXECUCOMP sample, we compute
the number of targets acquired during that year and the overall amount spent
on the deal(s). In our base sample of 11,179 firm-years where the internal
governance measure FRAC1 is available, 22% of the observations correspond
to firms making at least one acquisition; 1998 and 1999 are the peak years,
with more than 26% of firms making at least one acquisition. Most acquirers
make only one deal per year, but there are a few serial acquirers (three percent
of the observations correspond to at least five deals carried out during the
year).
2.1.5 Stock Returns
We are also interested in computing the net benefit of acquisitions. To do
this, we compute long run abnormal stock returns following the acquisition,
for each acquirer.
We merge the above SDC extract with our base sample from EXECU-
COMP. We end up with a list of 818 deals for which we know the acquirer,
the date of the acquisition, and FRAC1 (the share of executives appointed
after the CEO took office). Serial acquirers are overrepresented. Out of 818
deals, 188 involve one time buyers, while 368 involve firms carrying out at
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least four large deals. Overall, our sample features 359 different acquirers.
We then match this deal dataset with the acquirer’s stock returns as
provided by CRSP. More precisely, we retrieve monthly acquirer stock returns
from a period extending 48 months prior to each acquisition to 48 months
after the deal. We remove deals with less that 48 months of acquirer returns
history before the acquisition. This reduces our sample size to 669 deals. We
then estimate a three factor Fama-French model for each acquirer using the
48 pre-acquisition months available. We use the returns of the MKTRF,
SMB, and HML portfolios from Kenneth French’s web site. We then use this
model to compute abnormal returns both before and after the deal.
2.2 Constructing an Internal Governance Index
The assumption underlying the internal governance measure is that the CEO
is directly or indirectly involved in the recruitment process of top executives.
Hence, executives appointed during his tenure are more likely to be loyal
to him and/or share his preferences than executives who were picked by a
predecessor.
However, one needs to be careful with the mechanical drivers of FRAC1.
As a CEO’s seniority increases, a larger fraction of executives have (mechan-
ically) been appointed during his tenure. Conversely, executives who have
been with the firm longer are on average more likely to have been hired
before the current CEO. This suggests that FRAC1 is positively correlated
with CEO tenure, and negatively with executive seniority. Also, externally
appointed CEOs often have the mandate to arrange an “executive shake-up.”
When recruited from the outside, CEOs have enough bargaining power vis
à vis the board of directors to bring in their own teams. Hence, FRAC1
should be mechanically larger in the presence of outsider CEOs. Finally, a
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new CEO’s appointment is sometimes followed by immediate waves of exec-
utive departures and arrivals that might be unrelated to internal governance
(for example, top executives hoping for the top job leave the firm and need
to be replaced).
It might be tempting to see these mechanical sources of variation in the
proportion of aligned executives as exogenous shocks to internal governance,
but they might be related to firm performance for reasons orthogonal to in-
ternal governance. Ignoring these sources of variation would thus lead to
biased estimates of the effect of internal governance on performance. For
example, CEO tenure may directly affect corporate performance simply be-
cause experience on the job matters. Also, if the firm is in really bad shape,
a new CEO will have to inject more “fresh blood” into the corporate suite
(Hayes, Oyer, and Schaefer, 2005), which mechanically increases executive
turnover. We therefore choose be to as conservative as possible and filter
out these mechanical effects when we seek to measure “internal governance.”
Also, we will include them as controls in all performance regressions.7
More precisely, our internal governance (henceforth IG) index is defined
as the residual of the fraction of “dependent” executives regressed on its
expected mechanical correlates:
FRAC1it = a+ b.CEOTENit + c.EXECSENit + d.OUTSIDEit
+e.KNOWNit + f.FRAC1_1Yit + δt + εit (1)
where, for firm i in year t, CEOTENit stands for CEO’s tenure (in years),
EXECSENit for average executive seniority within the firm, OUTSIDEit is
a dummy indicating whether the CEO comes from outside the firm,KNOWNit
7By virtue of the Frisch Waugh theorem, the two approaches are equivalent. However,
our residual approach will be helpful when we look at stock returns following acquisitions,
since we will simply compare firms with negative and positive residuals.
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is the fraction of executives for which seniority is reported in the data, and
FRAC1_1Yit the fraction of executives that arrived within a year of the
CEO’s nomination. We also include year dummies δt. We define our Inter-
nal Governance (hereafter IG) index as the residual εit. It is larger when
more executives than expected were hired after the current CEO was ap-
pointed. Hence, high values of the IG index mean poor internal governance
(consistently with the Gompers-Ishi-Metrick external governance index).
The regression results are reported in Table 1, which has four columns.
Column 1 includes the seniority variables (EXECSEN for executives and
CEOTEN for the CEO). Column 2 adds the fraction of executives for which
seniority is actually reported in EXECUCOMP (KNOWN , which we include
to control for potential selection biases), and the fact that the CEO has been
appointed from the outside (OUTSIDE). Column 3 adds the fraction of
executives appointed within a year of the CEO’s nomination, to control for
management "shake-ups." Column 4 includes firm size, age and industry as
additionnal regressors. As it turns out, all these mechanical correlates of
FRAC1 work as we expected them to. FRAC1 is positively and strongly
correlated with CEO tenure and negatively correlated with executive tenure
(Columns 1 to 4). These two variables alone explain 25% of the variance
of FRAC1 (column 1). FRAC1 is positively correlated with the fraction
of executives whose seniority is reported: Hence, more "transparent" firms
tend to have executives appointed after the CEO. FRAC1 is also strongly
associated with the presence of outside CEOs. There are at least two possi-
ble interpretations for this. First, outside CEOs are often given a mandate
to reshuffle the top management, and as a result the fraction of executives
who joined the company with them is large. As it turns out, the coefficient
on OUTSIDE is somewhat reduced when we also include FRAC1_1Y in
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column 3. But it remains positive and significant, which leaves room for
additional explanations: the appointment of outside CEOs triggers the de-
parture of talented executives who were hoping to get the top job. Another
possibility could simply be that management shake-ups tend to happen when
the firm is doing badly, which may also generate departures. In any case, the
need to replace the lost executives mechanically increases our index. Finally,
firm level variables (industry, age, or even size) are not strongly correlated
with FRAC1, and accordingly explain little of its variance. Thus, in the
following analysis, we use estimates from column (3), i.e., compute IG using
CEO and executives’ characteristics (which account for 71% of the variance
of FRAC1), but not the firm level variables (which account for a mere 2%).
Last, one possible concern could be that our internal governance index
may be correlated with intense merger activity in the past. After many merg-
ers, top executives from the targets join the executive suite, mechanically
increasing our index. If the firm still has trouble “digesting” its past ac-
quisitions, it is likely to underperform on both accounting and stock price
measures. To address this concern, we correlated our residual IG index with
the number of past acquisitions for a cross section of firms in 2000. We found
no evidence that high IG index firms had bought a particularly large num-
ber of firms in the 1990s. This is robust to various controls and to the year
chosen. Our index is thus not a proxy for M&A “indigestion.”
3 Internal Governance and Corporate Per-
formance
We start by investigating the correlation between internal governance and
corporate performance. Figure 1 provides a first look at the relationship be-
tween our IG index and corporate performance. In this figure, we split the
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sample distribution of our IG index into five quantiles. Then, for each quan-
tile, we compute the mean industry8 adjusted performance, as well as the
95% confidence band assuming normality. Performance is measured through
ROA (left panel) and market to book value of assets (right panel). Fig-
ure 1 shows a positive and statistically significant association between good
internal governance (low values of our IG index) and corporate performance.
3.1 Basic Results
As discussed above, some mechanical correlates of internal governance may
be correlated with corporate performance. For example, junior CEOs or
executives may be on average worse performers simply because they lack
experience. We thus move to a multivariate analysis that allows us to capture
these "human capital" effects. We run the following regression:
Yit = α+ βIGit−1 + (IG controls)it + (Firm controls)it + εit (2)
where Yit measures corporate performance (ROA, market to book value of
assets). IGit−1 is our measure of internal governance, lagged one period.9
We include two sets of controls. First, the mechanical correlates of our in-
dex are included since it may be argued that they directly affect corporate
performance (CEO tenure, mean executive seniority, share of executive hired
right after the CEO, a dummy indicating if the CEO is an insider or not).
However, we must bear in mind that, because of the Frisch Waugh theorem,
their inclusion does not affect our estimate of β (the IG index is by definition
orthogonal to these variables, so they do not create any “omitted variable
bias”). Secondly, we add firm level controls that are traditionnally strong
correlates of performance: log(firm age+1), log(assets), year dummies, and
8We used the Fama-French 48 industries (Fama and French (1997)).
9We seek to partially avoid obvious simultaneity biases, such as the ones we discuss
below. As it turns out, our results are insensitive to the time-lag used.
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48 Fama-French industry dummies. Since we have several observations per
firm (corresponding to different years), and because IGit is strongly persis-
tent, it is likely that the εit are not independent from different observations
of the same firm i. Hence, we correct for this form of heteroskedasticity by
looking at Hubert-White-Sandwich estimates.
The sample correlation between performance and the IG index is strong
and stable across years (results available from the authors). Multivariate
regression results are reported in Table 2. Columns 1 to 3 use ROA as de-
pendent variable in equation (2); columns 4 to 6 use market to book value
of assets.10 Columns 1 and 4 report regression results only with firm level
controls, and columns 2 and 5 include the mechanical correlates of the index.
As expected, the difference is negligible, and stems from the fact that the
sample on which the index is estimated (Table 1, column 3) is slightly dif-
ferent from the sample used for the performance regressions (2). Columns 3
and 6 further control for initial performance, as a limited attempt to control
for fixed effects.11 Each time, our index of governance is significantly and
robustly correlated with performance: a one standard deviation increase in
IG results in a decrease of about 1.5 ROA percentage point and about 10%
of market value of assets. The explanatory power of this effect is not very
large (some 10% of standard deviation of the explained variable), but, as we
will see, it is consistently significant and easily surpasses the usual “external”
corporate governance measures. Also, the small size of our coefficients should
not surprise us given the noise of our internal governance measure FRAC1
(see section 2.1).
10Similar results are obtained with Return on Equity, but we did not report them because
of space limitation.
11We have also run, but not reported, regressions of corporate performance on FRAC1,
the fraction of executives hired after the CEO took office, as well as various controls.
FRAC1 turned out to be highly significant in all specifications we tested. This is not
surprising by virtue of Frisch Waugh theorem.
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3.2 Robustness Checks and Causality
Table 3 checks whether the performance-IG correlation reported in Table 2
is driven by any particular subperiod. In this table, we report, for both mea-
sures of corporate performance, the point estimate of β in (2) where internal
goverance is measured by IG, including both firm level and mechanical con-
trols as in columns 2 and 5 of table 2, except that one regression is run for
each year. As it turns out, the point estimate is fairly stable across periods
and significant in most years. As a consistency check, we verified that we get
similar magnitudes and significance levels by regressing directly on FRAC1,
our unfiltered measure of internal governance, rather than on our internal
governance index.
There are many stories consistent with the relation between IG and per-
formance found in Tables 2 and 3. Our favored interpretation is that strong
internal governance is a way for shareholders to “hold the CEO on a tight
leash” and prevent the CEO from undertaking “crazy” projects or building
an empire. One could argue, however, that the causality runs in the opposite
direction: declining performance may actually trigger an increase in IG (a
drop in our measure of internal governance). One plausible story could be
based on management turnover. In most firms, poor performance triggers a
change in the management team; when the situation is critical, the newly ap-
pointed CEO is more likely to bring his own team. In this scenario, internal
governance worsens because performance declines, not the contrary. Another
story could simply be that, when the firm is about to do badly, if top execu-
tives had a higher propensity to “leave the sinking ship” than the CEO, IG
would rise even before performance declines. One possible explanation for
this is that executives can observe the CEO’s ability, or the evolution of the
firm’s markets, before they materialize in corporate accounts.
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While we have no “smoking gun” to assess the causal relation between
internal governance and corporate performance, we can at least take pre-
liminary steps to reduce the likelihood of reverse causation by looking at
the joint dynamics of internal governance and corporate performance. Do
changes in corporate performance happen before or after changes in inter-
nal governance? To test these two hypotheses, we run the following two
regressions:
Yit = α+ βIGit−L + γYit−L + controlsit + εit (3)
IGit = a+ bIGit−L + cYit−L + controlsit + εit (4)
where we use one and two year lags (L = 1, 2) and Yit is the firm’s corporate
performance at date t. If changes in corporate performance tend to lead
changes in IG, we should not be able to reject that c > 0 and γ = 0. Such
a test can be thought of as the panel data version of causality tests à la
Granger in time series analysis.
Estimates of equations (3)-(4) are reported in Table 4. All regressions
include firm level controls (age, size, year and industry dummies). Column
(1) reports the estimates of β and γ of equation (3), while column (2) reports
the estimates of b and c from (4). The top panel reports the regression results
assuming L = 1. The bottom panel assumes L = 2. The results suggest
that, in general, changes in internal governance happen before changes in
corporate performance as estimates of c are never significantly different from
zero, while estimates of β are. The fact that this result holds with a two-
year lag weakens the possibility that poor internal governance is driven by
management’s expectation of future bad performance.
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4 Internal Governance and Acquisitions
To test whether internal governance increases the quality of the firm’s strat-
egy by constraining the CEO in his choices, a natural place to look is at
the firm’s acquisition policy. There is substantial debate among financial
economists as to whether long-run acquisition returns are positive or nega-
tive for the acquiring firm. Loughran and Vijh (1997) find that the returns
to long-run investors in acquiring firms are on average negative, in particular
when the deal is financed with stock issues. Mitchell and Stafford (1999),
among others, criticize their estimates, partly because post acquisition re-
turns tend not to be independent events, as acquisitions generally cluster
around stock market booms. The main problem with this literature is that
there is considerable heterogeneity among types of acquisitions and their per-
formance. Thus, financial economists lose substantial information on their
entire distribution by focusing on average returns and average profitability.
In attempt to reduce this heterogeneity, some recent papers have outlined the
size of acquisitions as a key factor for success or failure (Moeller, Schlinge-
mann, and Stulz (2005), Bradley and Sundaram (2004)). The evidence they
present is consistent with “small” acquisitions as value-creating, and large
ones as value-destroying. Following up on these papers, we look at the effect
of internal governance on shareholder losses (gains) in large acquisitions.
But before looking at gains, we first focus on the relation between internal
governance and acquisition policy. We find that firms with good internal
governance do not make fewer acquisitions and that their acquisitions do
not correspond to smaller purchases. We follow Gompers, Ishii and Metrick
(2003), and use SDC to compute, for each firm-year of our EXECUCOMP
extract: (1) the number of deals of more than $10 million in value and
(2) the overall amount of all deals struck within the year (the sum of all
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transaction values if there are several deals), normalized by the acquirer’s
market capitalisation. None of these measures of acquisition intensity proved
to be correlated with our IG-index. Moreover, we find that the IG index is not
correlated with the number of past acquisitions, which means that selecting
firms with poor internal governance does not select "serial acquirers."
We then turned to the impact of internal governance on acquisition qual-
ity. As argued above, we focus on large acquisitions (whose value exceeds
$300 million $). To measure the performance of acquisitions, we first follow
Loughran and Vijh (1997) and focus here on the acquirer’s long term ab-
normal stock returns, which we compute using a four factor pricing model
(the Fama-French (1996) three factors plus Carhart’s (1997) momentum fac-
tor) estimated at the firm level in the 48 months preceeding the acquisition.
We restrict ourselves to the 1993-2002 period, in order to be able to use
EXECUCOMP information.
We split the sample of transactions into two parts (each comprising some
400 deals): deals where the acquirer has above-median IG index (poor in-
ternal governance), and deals where the acquirer has below-median IG index
(good internal governance) in the year preceding the acquisition. Columns
1 and 2 of Table 5 report, separately for good and poor internal governance
acquirers, the average cumulative abnormal returns, starting 12 months be-
fore the deal up to 48 months after the deal. Column 3 reports the difference
in cumulative returns, and tests for the equality of average returns using a
standard t-test, without assuming equality of variances. Figure 2 plots cu-
mulative abnormal returns for each month, separately for poor (left panel)
and good (right panel) internal governance acquirers.
We find that firms with poor internal governance make largely under-
performing acquisitions. Four years after the acquisition, firms with good
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internal governance have on average lost some 15% of shareholder value,
which is significantly different from zero. However, firms with poor internal
governance have lost almost 30%, which is both significantly different from
zero and from the wealth lost by long term shareholders of well governed
firms. This difference is robust to (1) the way we split the sample, on con-
dition that each contains enough observations in each category (good/poor
governance) and (2) to the pricing model (results are almost similar when
we omit the momentum factor; they are somewhat noisier, but still point in
the right direction if we use the CAPM or if we merely substract the market
return from stock returns).
As a robustness check, we then look at the significance of our results us-
ing a calendar time portfolio method as recommended e.g., by Mitchell and
Stafford (1997) or Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999). This method addresses
the critique that, due to their time overlap, post-event returns are not in-
dependent. Another problem is that measurement errors inherent in the
computation of individual abnormal returns are compounded by calculating
cumulative returns.
For our sample of acquisitions, we therefore construct two equally weighted
portfolios of firms that completed at least one acquisition within the last n
months. The first portfolio is long in acquirers whose internal governance
index one year prior to the acquisition is below-median (the “good internal
governance” portfolio). The second portfolio is long in acquiring firms with
above median IG index (the “poor internal governance” portfolio). Both
portfolios are therefore rebalanced each month as acquirers whose deal oc-
cured more than n months ago leave and new acquirers enter. Let RPn,t
(resp. RGn,t) be the monthly return of the poor (resp. good) internal gover-
nance portfolios.
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We then estimate the abnormal returns of the two portfolios with a four-
factor asset pricing model (the three Fama French factors plus the momentum
factor, all available from the Kenneth French website). We also estimate the
abnormal returns of a portfolio that is long in good internal governance, and
short in poor internal governance acquirers, as in equation (7):
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The intercepts of these regressions αGn , αPn , and αG−Pn represent the aver-
age monthly abnormal returns, given the model. These "alphas" are reported
in Table 6, for n = 12, 24, 36 and 48 months. First, notice that the long-
run abnormal returns of all acquisitions (which we report as a benchmark in
the first line of Table 6) are slightly positive and marginally significant, in
contrast with the results of long run stock returns, which are negative and sig-
nificant. This discrepancy is at the heart of the methodological controversy
on long-run stock return studies.12
When we sort by internal governance value, results confirm our cumu-
lative abnormal returns analysis: Abnormal returns to good internal gover-
12When looking at three year returns on acquiring firms, Mitchell and Stafford (2000)
find an equal weighted monthly alpha of -0.2%, which is statistically significant. The
difference between our result and theirs may stem from the time period chosen (we look
at 1993-2002, while their time frame is 1961-1993). Another possibility is that firms
are selected on the basis of their belonging to EXECUCOMP (we will return to this
issue below). This, however, should not affect the comparison between poor and good
governance firms.
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nance firms after major acquisitions are positive and significant (some 0.5%
per month) within 1, 2, 3 or 4 years following the deal announcement. They
are small and insignificant for poor internal governance firms. Our long-short
portfolio’s alphas are positive and significant when the selection window is
sufficiently large (last 24, 36 or 48 months), and less so in the short run (last
12 months). This is to some extent consistent with evidence from Table 5,
where the difference in value destroyed widens over time.
5 Internal Governance and Stock Returns
The previous section shows that internal governance influences the quality
of a firm’s strategy and that the market does not immediately price this
effect: acquisitions of poor IG firms are followed by long-term negative per-
formance. If the market underestimates the impact of internal governance on
a firm’s performance, it is possible that our measure of internal governance
has predictive power on stock-returns. This section investigates this issue,
by extending the previous analysis from acquiring firms to all firms. Positive
abnormal returns for good internal governance need not be incompatible with
market efficiency, and this evidence can be subject to several interpretations.
It could be that the market underestimates its benefits, that these benefits
turned out to be larger than expected or simply that the information we used
to construct our index was not available to investors in real time. One other
possible explanation could be that such abnormal returns proxy for a hidden
risk factor. Distinguishing between these explanations is, we believe, beyond
the scope of this paper.
We start by constructing a good and a poor internal governance portfolio.
The poor (resp. good) governance portfolio is long in all firms whose internal
governance index was in the top quartile (resp. bottom quartile) of the IG
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distribution of the previous year. We look at both value and equal weighted
portfolios (the weighting scheme uses the stockmarket capitalization in Jan-
uary of the current year). These portfolios are rebalanced every year as firms’
stockmarket capitalizations change, and firms change governance category.
Figure 3 provides an indication of the relative long-run performance of
the good and poor governance (value weighted) portfolios. It looks at the
cumulative returns of investing $100 in these portfolios in January 1993,
over the 1993-2002 period. Investing $100 in January 1993 in the portfolio
of good IG companies yields $400 by the end of 2002, while investing in
the poor governance portfolio yields less than $250. In order to show that
this difference in returns is not driven by the usual risk factors, we then
regress monthly returns of the good/poor internal governance portfolios (RGt ,
RBt ) on Fama and French (1996)’s three risk factors, plus Carhart (1997)’s
momentum factor. We also look at the returns of the portfolio that is long
in good internal governance stocks, and short in poor internal governance
stocks. This amounts to running the following three regressions, for both
value and equal weighted portfolios:
E
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The intercepts αG, αP , and αG−P of these regressions are the excess returns.
Results are reported in Table 7 for three different models: a CAPM (which
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assumes s = h = u = 0), the Fama-French 3-factor model (assuming u = 0),
and the full 4-factor model. We show equal-weighted (left panel) and value-
weighted (right panel) regressions. Panel A looks at the returns of a portfolio
made up of all firms in the matched COMPUSTAT-CRSP-EXECUCOMP
panel. Panel B provides estimates for the good governance portfolio. Panel
C looks at the poor governance portfolio, while panel D focuses on the long-
short strategy.
To interpret our results, it is first important to note that our whole sample
of companies yields a positive and significant alpha for both value-weighted
and equal-weighted portfolios (panel A). This is driven by the fact that EXE-
CUCOMP includes only S&P 1500 companies, and is by design biased toward
ex post successful companies. For that reason, both portfolios (good and poor
IG companies) yield positive alphas (panels B and C). For all specifications
and weighting, the good IG portfolio has a larger alpha than the poor IG
portfolio. Yet, the difference is insignificant and small for equal-weighted
portfolios. As a result, the equal-weighted long-short strategy (panel D) has
an alpha that is insignificant, albeit positive, in the four-factor pricing model,
albeit positive. Reassuringly, however, and consistently with Figure 3, the
value-weighted long-short strategy yields positive alphas (0.5% monthly in
the four-factors specification), with no significant load on the market and a
strong negative loading on the momentum factor.
Finally, Table 8 explains why our alphas lose in statistical significance in
the equal-weighted portfolio: The long-short strategy remains significant on
non-weighted regressions when we restrict ourselves to the top one-half mar-
ket capitalizations. One possible explanation is that our measure of internal
governance is noisier for small caps. Another could be that internal gov-
ernance matters more for large firms, which tend to have less concentrated
26
ownership and are therefore less likely to have a dominant owner. Finally, it
is possible that large firms are more involved in large, value-destroying ac-
quisitions, and, as a result, internal governance is more important for them.
6 External Versus Internal Governance
We have shown that our measure of “internal governance” correlates well
with (1) overall corporate performance and (2) the efficiency of some crucial
strategy choices (acquisitions). However, one possible story consistent with
such evidence is that we are proxying for corporate governance in the “tradi-
tional” sense: firms with weak shareholders, weak boards and imperial CEOs
could also be the ones where the CEO has all the power to appoint faithful
executives. Hence, a well-entrenched CEO is more likely to replace execu-
tives who do not show sufficient loyalty, which makes our IG index rise. At
the same time, weak boards do not have the means to oppose large, wasteful
acquisitions.
This alternative story puts external governance back to the fore: when
“external” governance is poor, the firm performs less well, and most execu-
tives have had less time on the job than the CEO. If this were true, however,
the existing literature on “external” governance would have had no trouble
in finding a positive statistical relation between corporate performance and
measures of governance quality. Existing contributions have repeatedly failed
to find a positive correlation between the share of outsiders in the board and
profitability (see Baghat and Black (2003), and also Hermalin and Weis-
bach (2003) for a survey). Using corporate charter-based governance mea-
sures, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) do not find a consistent correlation
between investor-friendly firm-level institutions and operating performance.
Thus, the available evidence casts doubts on internal governance as a proxy
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of external governance in our regressions.
We look directly at the correlations between our measure of internal
governance and some measures of “external” governance that are used in
the literature. To do this, we regress our internal governance index on (1)
the Gompers-Ishii-Metrick index of governance, which takes large values for
management-friendly corporate charters, (2) the fact that the CEO is also
the chairman of the board, which measures the CEO’s degree of power on
the board (see, for example, Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2004)), (3) the
size of the board (Yermack (1996) shows that firms with large boards are less
efficient), (4) the share of current employees, and (5) of past employees as
corporate directors. The first measure is available for a subset of our main
sample - the largest firms. The second measure is available for our whole
sample as it is extracted from EXECUCOMP. The third, fourth, and fifth
measures are extracted from IRRC’s boards and directors database and so
available only for a subsample of our main dataset.
Overall, the evidence is not consistent with internal governance being a
proxy of external governance. Regression results, controlling for both firm
level variables and mechanical correlates of IG, are reported in Table 9.
Columns 1-3 include the external governance indexes separately, while col-
umn 4 combines all of them. Some results point slightly toward a correlation
between the two governance measures. Our index is correlated with the char-
ter based GIM index (the coefficient is small and significant at 5%). Also,
internal governance is worse when the CEO is chairman, suggesting that
CEOs who are powerful inside the firm are also powerful in the boardroom.
The only other significant relation is more surprising: internal governance
turns out to be better when there are more employees sitting on the board
of directors. The literature on independent directors reports this correla-
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tion: it is usually interpreted as evidence that bad performing firms tend
to appoint outsiders on the board (Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), Kaplan
and Minton (1994)). One other, more daring, interpretation of this negative
correlation between internal and external governance is the following. The
particularity of these board members (employees) is their intimate knowledge
of human capital and the power struggles within the firm. Insiders sitting
on the board therefore have enough information about the competence of
executives to efficiently interfere with the CEO in the nominating process.
By preventing the CEO from appointing new subordinates, they enforce a
good level of internal governance. This interpretation does, however, reverse
the conventional wisdom on employee-directors.
Table 9 suggests there might be some weak correlation between inter-
nal and external governance. We thus provide new estimates of equation
(2) in table 10 including an external governance measure as further control.
Columns 1-3 focus on ROA as a measure of performance, while columns 4-6
look at the effects on the market valuation of assets. Columns 1 and 4 include
the GIM index only, and the firm controls and mechanical correlates of (2).
Columns 2 and 5 add our internal governance IG index. Columns 3 and 6
include the other external governance indexes.
Consistent with Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), the GIM index is
negatively correlated with market to book, but not with operating perfor-
mance. However, this correlation with market to book disappears once we
include the index of internal governance. To be fair, the coefficient estimate
becomes noisier, but not smaller, partly because the number of observations
where our index and the GIM index overlap is less than 5,000. Notice that in
columns 2 and 5, the coefficient on internal governance is identical to some
results in Table 2.
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Finally, the inclusion of the other external governance indexes shows that
(1) most are not really correlated with corporate performance, which is con-
sistent with the existing literature, (2) the share of inside directors is pos-
itively correlated with performance and (3) the effect of our index remains
unaffected by the inclusion of these controls, even though they considerably
reduce the sample size.
Before concluding, we run a similar horse race between external and in-
ternal governance for our acquisition returns results. The simplest way to
do this is to ask whether after an acquisition, the long-run stock returns
of acquirers with poor external governance underperform those of acquirers
with good external governance. To do this, we repeat the exercise in section
4 by computing long-run cumulative abnormal returns for acquirers with an
above- and below-median GIM index. Average long-run returns are reported
in columns 4-6 of table 5, as well as in figure 4. Column 4 displays returns
to long-term shareholders of management-friendly companies, column 5 does
the same for shareholder-friendly companies. Column 6 computes the dif-
ference, and tests for equality. As is apparent from both the Table and the
figure, the two subgroups display strong negative returns for large acqui-
sitions (10-15% after four years); the difference between them, however, is
small and insignificant statistically.
7 Conclusion
This paper argues that the careful design of the chain of command within
the firm affects the efficiency of the decisions that are taken. Our infor-
mal argument is that independently-minded executives always impose more
constraints on the CEO than executives who owe him their jobs. These con-
straints may prevent controversial decisions from being taken, and have in
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general the useful effect of de-biasing the CEO. To do this, top executives do
not have to formally disobey, or enter in open conflict with their boss. They
may simply choose to be less enthusiastic in their work.
This argument is explored theoretically in a companion paper (Landier,
Sraer and Thesmar (2005)). Our framework is very simple: a firm has to
choose between two projects, A and B. A CEO receives a private signal as to
which project is best, and orders his executives to carry out the project that
he wants implemented. The executives can put in various degrees of effort.
Importantly, both CEO and executives have intrinsic preferences toward A
or B (they are biased). Their biases can be similar (executive dependence)
or different (executive independence). We make two key assumptions. First,
the CEO has privileged information on the project’s quality. Second, the top
executives have to carry out the project that they are ordered to implement,
and cannot openly disobey.
We find that it might be optimal, from an (unbiased) shareholder per-
spective to have executives who disagree with the CEO over the preferred
course of action. The reason is that the CEO has to “elicit the executive’s
support,” i.e., he needs them to put in high effort. This constraint will reduce
the CEO’s bias and lead to an improvement in decision-making. The effect
will be reinforced by increasing credibility: executives know that the CEO
will be less biased, and will, in consequence, believe his orders more often.
With independent executive, the CEO gains legitimacy. But dissent will also
be costly because it will “paralyze” the chain of command: executives will
be ordered to carry out projects they dislike more often, and will put in less
effort.
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B Tables
Table 1: Mechanical Correlates of Internal Governance
Fraction of executives
appointed after the CEO (×100)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO seniority 1.3∗∗∗ 1.3∗∗∗ 1.4∗∗∗ 1.5∗∗∗
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.7)
Executives’ mean seniority -1.2∗∗∗ -1.0∗∗∗ -0.9∗∗∗ -0.8∗∗∗
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Fraction of executives whose - 0.6∗∗∗ 0.5∗∗∗ 0.4∗∗∗
seniority is reported (×100) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
CEO from outside - 9.3∗∗∗ 6.9∗∗∗ 6.3∗∗∗
(0.8) (0.7) (0.7)
Fraction of executives appointed - - 0.5∗∗∗ 0.5∗∗∗
in the year foll. CEO nomination (×100) (0.0) (0.0)
Ln(Firm Age) - - - -1.0∗∗
(0.5)
Firm Size - - - -0.0
(0.2)
48 industry dummies No No No Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.25 0.62 0.71 0.73
Observations 11,147 8,728 8,728 8,166
Source: OLS estimates, allowing for heteroskdastic residuals, clustered at the firm
level. The fraction of executives appointed after the CEO is regressed on various
variables suspected to be mechanically correlated: column 1 controls for the fact
that the CEO is an outsider, the CEO seniority, as well as for the mean seniority
of executives; column 2 adds the number of executives appointed in the first two
years following the CEO nomination; column 3 adds firm specific control, namely
Firm Size as measured by log of Asset, log of Firm Age and the 48 Fama French
industries. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ means statistically different from zero at 10,5 and 1%
level of significance. Our Internal Governance Index is defined as the residual of
column (2) regression.
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Table 2: Accounting Performance and Internal Governance
Return on Assets (×100) Market to Book
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Internal governance index -7.1∗∗∗ -7.3∗∗∗ -3.7∗∗∗ -0.6∗∗∗ -0.6∗∗∗ -0.4∗∗
(delayed by 1 year) (1.5) (1.5) (1.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
[-1.1] [-1.1] [-0.6] [-0.1] [-0.1] [-0.1]
Controls:
Firm initial profitability No No Yes No No Yes
CEO, Executive characteristics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Firm log(assets), log(age) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year, Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: Huber-White-Sandwich estimates, allowing for correlation of all observa-
tions of a given firm. “Internal Governance Index” is the share of EXECUCOMP
executives who joined the company after the CEO was appointed, filtered from
mechanical effects. It is defined as the residual of the column (3) regression in
table 1. Corporate performance is measured through Return on Assets (first three
columns) and through market valuation of assets (last three columns). All regres-
sions use log(book assets), log(firm age), year dummies and the 48 Fama French
industry dummies. In columns 2 and 5, we add the CEO and executives character-
istics that serve as regressors in table 1. Column 3 (resp. column 6) further adds
the firm’s ROA (resp. market to book) computed in its first year of presence in
COMPUSTAT after 1991, as a limited attempt to control for firm level unobserved
heterogeneity. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ means statistically different from zero at 10,5 and 1%
level of significance. The term reported in brackets is the marginal effect of one
standard deviation change in governance index on the dependent variable.
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Table 3: Accounting Performance and Internal Governance - Year by Year
Results
ROA Market To Book
1993 -9.1∗∗∗ -0.4
(3.0) (0.4)
1994 -9.9∗∗∗ -0.9∗∗∗
(3.5) (0.3)
1995 -10.3∗∗∗ -0.5
(2.7) (0.3)
1996 -10.6∗∗∗ -0.5∗
(2.6) (0.3)
1997 -5.3∗∗ -0.8∗∗∗
(2.3) (0.3)
1998 -9.7∗∗∗ -1.1∗∗∗
(2.4) (0.3)
1999 -5.9∗∗∗ -0.9∗∗∗
(2.3) (0.3)
2000 -7.1∗∗∗ -0.8∗∗
(2.6) (0.3)
2001 -3.8 -0.2
(2.6) (0.3)
2002 -5.2∗∗ -0.3
(2.4) (0.3)
Fama-Mac Beth -7.7∗∗∗ -0.6∗∗∗
(0.8) (0.1)
Source: OLS estimates. Regressions of corporate performance on internal gover-
nance index and controls are run separately each year. The coefficients on internal
governance and their standard error are reported. Each column correponds to the
choice of one corporate performance measure (ROA or M/B). Corporate perfor-
mance is then regressed on one-year-lagged internal governance index, controlling
for CEO and executive seniority, fraction of executives reporting seniority, CEO’s
origin, log(assets), log(firm age), sales growth and 48 industry-dummies. The
specification is identical to the regression presented in table 2, columns 2 and
5. The bottom row indicates the Fama-Mac Beth estimate. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ means
statistically different from zero at 10,5 and 1% level of significance.
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Table 4: Accounting Performance and Internal Governance - Granger
Causality
Internal ROA
Governance (×100)
One-year-lag specification:
Internal governance index (-1) 0.8∗∗∗ -1.8∗∗∗
(0.0) (0.5)
ROA (-1) -0.5 0.8∗∗∗
(×100) (1.3) (0.0)
Two-year-lag specification:
Internal governance index (-2) 0.7∗∗∗ -2.0∗∗∗
(0.0) (0.8)
ROA (-2) -0.9 0.6∗∗∗
(×100) (2.4) (0.0)
Controls :
Firm log(assets),log(age) Yes Yes
Year, Industry FE Yes Yes
Source: Hubert-White-Sandwhich estimates, allowing for residuals correlated
across all observations of each firm. In the top panel, column 1 reports the esti-
mate of a regression of internal governance on one-year lagged internal governance
and one-year lagged corporate performance. Column 2 reports the result of a
regression of corporate performance on one-year lagged internal governance and
one-year lagged corporate performance. Both regressions control for firm age and
size, industry and year fixed effects. The bottom panel reports the same regres-
sion results, taking two-year-lags as explanatory variables, instead of one-year-lags.
Corporate performance is measured through Return on Assets. Standard errors are
between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ means statistically different from zero at 10,5
and 1% level of significance.
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Table 5: Long Run Abnormal Returns Following a Major Acquisition
Internal Governance External Governance
Poor Good Difference Poor Good Difference
Months since acquisition
-12 - - - - - -
-6 2.7 1.9 -0.8 1.7 1.6 -0.1
0 0.6 1.6 1.0 1.0 1.2 0.3
+6 -5.3 2.5 7.8∗∗∗ -3.3 0.6 3.9
+12 -11.4 -0.4 10.9∗∗∗ -5.5 -2.8 2.7
+18 -16.0 -6.4 9.6∗∗∗ -11.8 -4.5 7.3∗∗
+24 -18.0 -8.4 9.6∗∗ -15.1 -5.3 9.7∗∗
+30 -21.2 -11.4 9.8∗∗ -14.0 -9.0 4.8
+36 -21.7 -12.3 9.4∗ -14.3 -11.3 3.0
+42 -25.0 -12.9 12.0∗∗ -14.2 -14.8 -0.6
+48 -25.4 -9.4 16.2∗∗∗ -11.8 -15.3 -3.5
Source: 818 acquisitions from SDC Database. Abnormal returns are computed
after estimating, for each acquirer, a Fama French 3 factor model + momentum on
the 48 months preceeding the acquisition. Cumulative abnormal returns, starting
12 months before the deal, are computed for each firm. Column 1 reports, every
6 months, the average cumulative abnormal returns of acquirers with internal
governance lower than median. Column 2 does the same for above median internal
governance acquirers, while column 3 reports the difference. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ means
statistically different from zero at 10,5 and 1% level of significance, using a standard
test of equality, assuming away the equality of variances.
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Table 6: Post Acquisition Alphas of Acquiring Firms: Sorted by Internal
Governance
Equal weights
0 - 12 0 - 24 0 - 36 0 - 48
All acquisitions 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3
(1.3) (1.4) (1.6) (1.9)
Longs Good IG 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6
(2.3) (2.6) (3.1) (3.3)
Longs Poor IG 0.1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0
(0.4) (0.1) (0.2) (0.0)
Good IG - Poor IG 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6
(1.4) (1.9) (2.5) (2.5)
Source: CRSP, Compustat and Execucomp over 1993-2002. This table reports the
monthly alphas, in percentage points, of various portfolios, estimated using the
Fama French 3 factor model, augmented with the momentum factor (UMD). The
first line presents the monthly alphas of equal-weighted portfolios of firms who
made a significant acquisition less than 12, 24, 36 and 48 months ago. The second
line looks at the portfolio of past acquirers whose level of internal governance was
above median, before acquisition. The third line looks at the portfolio of past
acquirers whose level of internal governance was below median, before acquisition.
The fourth line looks at the portfolio long in high governance acquirers and short
in low internal governance acquirers. T-statistics are between brackets.
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Table 7: Returns of Portfolio Selected by Internal Governance Index
Equal Weighted Value Weighted
α RMRF SMB HML UML α RMRF SMB HML UML
A. Whole sample
0.7 1.0 - - - 0.2 1.0 - - -
(3.4) (22.9) (2.2) (54.6)
0.3 1.2 0.4 0.4 - 0.2 1.0 -0.1 -0.0 -
(2.4) (31.6) (12.3) (8.9) (2.5) (50.9) (5.5) (0.3)
0.6 1.1 0.5 0.4 -0.2 0.3 1.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
(5.1) (36.8) (16.7) (10.3) (8.9) (5.5) (62.2) (5.8) (1.3) (9.5)
B. Longs firms with good internal governance
0.8 1.1 - - - 0.4 1.1 - - -
(3.4) (30.0) (2.0) (23.4)
0.5 1.2 0.5 0.3 - 0.7 1.0 -0.3 -0.4 -
(3.2) (26.7) (10.5) (6.0) (3.5) (18.8) (5.6) (5.4)
0.7 1.1 0.5 0.3 -0.2 0.7 1.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.0
(5.0) (28.1) (12.6) (6.3) (5.8) (3.5) (18.1) (5.4) (5.4) (0.3)
C. Longs firms with poor internal governance
0.5 1.1 - - - 0.1 1.0 - - -
(2.2) (22.5) (0.4) (29.3)
0.3 1.2 0.5 0.3 - 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.1 -
(1.6) (25.2) (9.9) (6.0) (0.0) (24.8) (0.0) (1.7)
0.6 1.2 0.5 0.3 -0.2 0.2 1.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1
(3.9) (28.7) (13.4) (6.0) (8.1) (1.3) (25.3) (0.8) (1.5) (5.0)
D. Longs good internal gov. / shorts poor internal gov.
0.2 -0.1 - - - 0.4 0.1 - - -
(2.0) (2.4) (1.4) (2.2)
0.2 -0.1 -0.0 0.0 - 0.7 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -
(1.9) (1.8) (0.7) (0.0) (2.7) (0.8) (4.2) (5.1)
0.1 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 -0.0 -0.3 -0.4 0.1
(1.1) (1.2) (1.1) (0.2) (2.8) (2.0) (0.2) (4.7) (5.0) (2.5)
Source: CRSP, Compustat and Execucomp over 1993-2002. Monthly returns of
portfolios are regressed on various models of expected returns: the CAPM, the
Fama French three factor model and the FF model augmented with Carhart’s
momentum factor. The table presents point estimates of the loadings on various
factors, and the t- statistic between parentheses. The left part focuses on returns
of equal-weighted portfolios, while the right part looks at value-weighted portfolios
(using the preceding year’s market capitalizations as weights). Panel A presents
the expected returns of a portfolio of all firms which belong to CRSP, Compustat
and Execucomp. Panel B presents the portfolio long in firms ranking in the lower
25% of internal governance index (lower index means better governance) in the
preceeding year. Panel C presents the returns of a portfolio long in firms in the
high 25% of internal governance index. Panel D shows the corrseponding long-
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Table 8: Alphas of Internal Governance-Based Portfolios, Sorted by Size
Equal Weights Value Weights
Good IG Poor IG Good - Poor Good IG Poor IG Good - Poor
Sorted by size
< median 1.0 1.0 -0.1 0.9 0.8 0.1
(5.3) (5.2) (0.3) (4.3) (4.2) (0.7)
> median 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.1 0.6
(3.1) (1.1) (2.7) (5.7) (0.9) (3.8)
Source: CRSP, Compustat and Execucomp over 1993-2002. This table reports
the monthly alphas, in percentage points, of various portfolios, estimated using
the Fama French 3 factor model, augmented with the momentum factor (UMD).
We compute alphas for firms with above (resp. below) median values of internal
governance index. The sample is broken down by size as measured using the
previous years’ stockmarket capitalization. Within each of these half samples
(firms larger, or smaller than median), this table presents the alphas on high
(resp. low) internal governance firms. Columns 1-3 correspond to equal-weighted
portfolios, and columns 4-6 to value-weighted ones. Columns 1 and 4 present the
monthly alphas of a portfolio long in good IG firms. Columns 2 and 5 present
present the monthly alphas of a portfolio long in bad IG firms. Columns 3 and 6
present the monthy alpha of the corresponding long-short strategy.
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Table 9: Are Internal and External Governance Related ?
Internal Governance Index (×100)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GIM Governance index 0.3∗∗ - - 0.1
(0.2) (0.2)
CEO is Chairman 2.0∗∗ - 0.4
(0.9) (1.2)
Board size - - -0.2 -0.1
(0.2) (0.2)
Frac directors - - -11.5∗∗∗ -8.5∗
who are current employees (3.7) (4.4)
Frac indep. directors - - 0.2 1.5
who are former employees (4.9) (5.6)
CEO/Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
48 industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,734 7,432 3,447 2,610
Source: OLS estimates, allowing for heteroskdastic residuals. Internal governance
index (see table 1) is regressed on various corporate governance indicators, control-
ling for log(assets), log(firm age), sales growth, 48 industry-dummies, year fixed
effects, CEO tenure and executive seniority. Columns 1 to 4 add various corporate
governance controls. Column 1 uses the (mostly) corporate charter-based corpo-
rate governance index from Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). Column 2 uses the
number of directors on the board as a measure of board effectiveness. Columns
3 uses two classical measures of board dependence to the CEO: the share of cur-
rently employed directors and the share of past employees. Column 4 uses all four
measures simultaneously. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ means statistically different from zero at
10,5 and 1% level of significance.
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Table 10: Internal Versus External Governance
Return on Assets (×100) Market To Book
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Internal governance - -6.9∗∗∗ -5.7∗∗∗ - -0.87∗∗∗ -0.88∗∗∗
(delayed by 1 year) (1.9) (2.3) (0.26) (0.33)
GIM governance index -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.02∗ -0.02 -0.00
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
CEO = Chairman - - 0.2 - - -0.21∗
(0.8) (0.11)
Board size (# directors) - - -0.1 - - -0.02
(0.1) (0.02)
% Directors currently - - 7.4∗∗∗ - - -0.49
employed (2.7) (0.41)
% Directors previously - - 3.3 - - -0.51
employed (3.7) (0.50)
Firm/CEO controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
48 Industry effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 4,634 3,933 2,274 4,416 3,495 1,977
Source: Huber-White-Sandwich estimates, allowing for correlation of all observa-
tions of a given firm. The measure of internal governance is the share of EXECU-
COMP executives who joined the company after the CEO was appointed. Cor-
porate performance is measured through Return on Assets (first three columns)
and through Return on Equity (last three columns). All regressions use as con-
trols: CEO and executive seniorities, sales growth, log(book assets), log(Firm age),
year dummies and the 48 Fama French industry dummies. Columns 1 and 4 use
the corporate charter based corporate governance index from Gompers, Ishii and
Metrick (2003). Columns 2 and 5 use the number of directors on the board as
a measure of board effectiveness. Columns 3 and 6 use two classical measures of
board dependence on the CEO: the share of current and past employees serving
as directors. The limited availability of corporate governance data is responsible
for the drop in observation number. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ means statistically different from
zero at 10,5 and 1% level of significance.
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